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Online auctions, in the absence of spatial, temporal and geographic constraints, provide an alternative supply chain 
channel for the distribution of goods and services. This channel differs from the common posted-price mechanism that 
is typically used in the retail sector. In consumer-oriented markets, buyers can now experience the thrill of ‘winning’ a 
product, potentially at a bargain, as opposed to the typically more tedious notion of ‘buying’ it. Sellers, on the other 
hand, have an additional channel to distribute their goods, and the opportunity to liquidate rapidly aging goods at 
greater than salvage values. The primary facilitator of this phenomenon is the widespread adoption of electronic 
commerce over an open-source, ubiquitous Internet Protocol (IP) based network. In this paper, we derive an optimal 
bidding strategy in sequential auctions that incorporates option value assessment. Furthermore, we establish that our 
optimal bidding strategy is tractable since it is independent of the bidding strategies of other bidders in the current 
auction and is only dependent on the option value assessment 
 




1.1 Auction theory 
 
As an old price-discovering mechanism, auction entered 
the economics literature relatively recently. Two papers 
have been regarded as initial references [21, 44]. The 
full flowering of theory came only at the end of the 
1970s. A very readable introduction to the state of this 
field by the late 1980s is in McAfee and McMillan [32]. 
Another helpful introductory article is Maskin and Riley 
[31]. Why should we study auction? McAfee and 
McMillan explained that auction theory provided one 
explicit model of price making. A less fundamental but 
more practical reason for studying auction is that 
auction is of considerable empirical significance. The 
value of goods exchanged each year by auction is huge. 
This fact in itself indicates that some theoretical study 
of auction is warranted. More over, as will be seen, the 
theory of auction is closer to applications than is most 
frontier mathematical economics [20]. Next, we will 
give an overview on this topic from three perspectives: 
definition, schemes and economic models. 
 
Definition 
Oxford Dictionary defines an auction as a “public sale 
in which articles are sold to maker of the highest bid”. 
This definition describes the English auction, which 
cannot reflect the essence of auction. An authoritative 
definition is given by McAfee and McMillan [32] as 
follows: an auction is a market institution with an 
explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and 
prices on the basis of bids from the market participants. 
 
Basic auction schemes 
This section will give the reader a brief overview of the 
auction schemes. 
 
Although there are various kinds of auction 
classifications, there appears to be no unified forms. 
Here we briefly summarized each classification and 
discussed them from traditional classifications. 
 
a. According to the traditional view, we can divide 
auctions into “outcry auction” and “sealed-bid auction”. 
Outcry auction includes the ascending-price auction 
(English Auction) and the descending-price auction 
(Dutch Auction). Sealed-bid auction includes the 
first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price 
sealed-bid auction. It should be pointed out that it was 
Vickrey who first defined the second-price sealed-bid 
auction. As such, the second-price sealed-bid auction is 
usually also called the Vickrey auction. Jason and 
Margolis [23] presented an nth price mechanism, which, 
however, didn’t receive any recognition from other 
researchers. 
 
b. According to the market structure, we divide auctions 
into single auction and double auction. Single auction is 
a “one to many” auction in nature. Either buyer or seller 
monopolizes the market resource and holds the market. 
Double auction differs from single auction in structure. 
Double auction is “many to many”. Both sides are 
related through supply and demand. An environment 
where vendors and buyers meet with the goal to sell and 
buy goods is commonly called a market. As there are 
many different interpretations of what a market is, such 
an environment should rather be called a market 
framework. Figure 1 shows an example of such a 
framework. There are four cases presented: 1. One 
vendor and one buyer directly negotiate in the classical 
sense; 2. Multiple vendors and one buyer are engaged in 
a reverse auction; 3. Multiple buyers and one vendor are 
engaged in a classical auction (English, Dutch, Vickery, 
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etc.); 4. Multiple buyers and vendors trade in a market.  
 
c. According to the value form, we divide auctions into 
common-value auction and private-value auction. In 
certain auction, because of the information asymmetry, 
only that buyer knows one buyer’s valuation of a 
product; not all buyers may agree on a product’s value; 
buyers may value a product differently for different 
reasons. We call this auction private value auction. The 
main commodities for this auction type are paintings, 
Egyptian thimbles, and Victorian snuffboxes etc. In a 
common-value auction, the actual value of (or any 
known measure of) the goods is the same for all buyers. 
Buyers start with different estimates or private 
information about the following aspects of the goods: 
quality of the goods, remaining economic life of the 
goods, and some “measure” of the goods. In a 
common-value auction, buyers can receive meaningful 
information about the product’s “true value” from other 
buyers’ bids. The typical commodity for this auction is 
mineral rights. In a private-value auction, buyers rarely 
get any information about the product’s “true value” 
from other buyers.  
 
d. According to the status of buyers and sellers, we can 
divide traditional auctions into forward auction and 
reverse auction. In reverse auction, sellers bid for a 
buyers’ business. The seller that makes the lowest bid 
wins the auction. Just as there are open and sealed bid 
auction in the “regular” auction format－there are open 
and sealed bid formats in reverse auction too. The new 
e-procurement system is a typical reverse auction 
system. Buyers are on a good wicket, and sellers bid for 
commodity.  
 
1.2 Auction online 
 
Internet allows direct contact between buyers and sellers, 
and provides a suitable and popular place for conducting 
auction, which are usually called e-auction or auction 
online. We define e-auction as a web page, which 
displays information about a good or service with the 
intent to sell it through a competitive bidding procedure 
to the highest bidder. In fact, e-auction is an application 
environment of auction, so we cannot study e-auction as 
a separate research field. Most literature on e-auction is 
about its role in enterprise [2, 18, 24, 48]. 
 
There are many differences between traditional auction 
and e-auction. E-auction gives bidders increased 
convenience both geographic and temporal. These 
increased conveniences can also benefit the seller by 
creating a larger market for auctioned good. 
Furthermore, search engines and clickable hierarchies of 
categories for browsing make it more convenient for a 
bidder to find the goods she is looking for. 
 
The earliest e-auction Web sites are Onsale and eBay 
which opened in 1995. It was the first to take advantage 
of the technologies offered by the Web, including the 
use of automated bids entered through electronic forms, 
and search engines and clickable categories to allow 
bidder to locate their items of interest. In the past 
several years, two large Web-based companies, Yahoo! 
and Amazon, have announced their own person to 
person auction services very much like eBay’s. It will be 
interesting to see whether these well-funded later 
entrants will be able to take business away from eBay. 
E-auction is potentially rich sources of study both for 
economic theorists and for empiricists. 
 
In electronic auction, we can have readily available 
items and face global market; we can easily access 
information and have a large scale of operation; we have 
flexible duration and can compete with other auctions 
and retailers. The advantages mentioned above indicate 
that electronic auction will ultimately and inevitably 
replace traditional auction. 
 
Business-to-consumer online auctions are heating up as 
an efficient and flexible sales channel. Along with the 
other two types of online auctions, namely 
consumer-to-consumer and business to business 
auctions, they represent a new class of mercantile 
processes that are ushering in the networked economy, 
but are not fully understood yet. Yong and Yum[51] have 
called for an extensive examination of the pervasive 
impact of advance electronic communication on the 
theory and practice of auctions. For a wide variety of 
goods sold over the Internet, consumers now have an 
interesting choice of mercantile processes to utilize to 
buy these goods. Broadly, these different processes can 
be broken into static posted-price mechanisms and 
dynamic interactive pricing mechanisms such as online 
auctions. In this context, online auctioneers are striving 
to find the correct strategic and tactical direction that 
ensures their long-term profitability. This involves 
optimizing existing as well as designing interesting new 
mercantile processes to sell their products. This paper is 
an attempt to analyze this emerging market structure 
with respect to the welfare of the different economic 
agents involved namely the B2C auctioneers (we 
implicitly assume the joint interest of the seller and the 
auctioneer, if they are different) and consumers. There 
already exists a vast body of literature dealing with the 
theory of auctions and optimal mechanism design. 
However, the majority of the work focuses on the 
analysis of single auctions and is carried out in isolation 
from the broader context of the markets in which these 
auctions take place. It should also be noted that despite 
the presence of a vast body of literature dealing with 
traditional auctions, one could not call these 
auctions ’mainstream’ from a consumer’s viewpoint. It 
is only after the synergetic combination of traditional 
auctions with Internet technology that this sphere of 
economic activity has blossomed into significance.  
 
In the next section of this paper, we derive an optimal 
bidding strategy in sequential auctions that incorporates 
option value assessment. Furthermore, we establish that 
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our optimal bidding strategy is tractable since it is 
independent of the bidding strategies of other bidders in 
the current auction and is only dependent on the option 
value assessment. 
 
2 OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN 
 
What is the best auction design to use for a given selling 
situation? The work covered below all assumes a 
risk-neutral seller selling a single indivisible item to one 
of possibly several potential buyers. 
 
In cases in which the bidder are risk-neutral, symmetric, 
and follow the IPV model, the Revenue Equivalence 
Therem holds(RET). The RET says that under certain 
conditions, the four major auction types-English, Dutch, 
First Price Sealed bid, and Vickrey auction will deliver 
the seller the same expected revenue. In this case, the 
optimal auction requires the seller to set a reserve price 
below which he will not sell the item. This price is set to 
mimic the expected bid of the second-highest bidder, 
and is strictly greater than the seller’s reserve valuation. 
Moreover, the seller should go ahead and announce this 
reserve price before the auction begins. 
 
Weakening the assumptions of the RET leads to 
changes in the optimal auction design. In cases where 
the bidders are risk-averse, but the assumptions of 
symmetry and IPV still hold, the Dutch and the First 
price sealed bid auctions. A seller should still optimal 
set a reserve price and possibly add an entry fee as well. 
 
In cases where the bidders have affiliated values but 
remain risk-neutral and symmetric, sellers should use 
the English auction because the it yields the highest 
expected revenue, followed by the Vickrey auction, 
which is then followed by the Vickrey auction, which is 
then followed by the last-place tie between the Dutch 
and First price sealed bid. Moreover, a seller should still 
set reserve prices and entry fees; in fact, given a choice 
between two pairs which will attract the same set of 
bidders, it pays to choose the pair with higher entry fee 
and the lower reserve price. Side payments from the 
auctioneer to the bidders are sometimes optimal, but 
rarely used in practice. 
 
Finally, when bidders are asymmetric, but remain 
risk-neutral and have IPV, the optimal auction format is 
highly variable. 
 
The key is that auction mechanism design is 
theoretically well-grounded. There are different auctions 
are known to be optimal in different situations. 
Moreover, auctions for which truthtelling is the 
dominant strategy do exist and are quite feasible. Hence, 
an agents’s best possible course of action could be 
carried out by a dumb agent simply telling the truth. 
There are two important issues in the problem of 
optimal auction design. One is strategy. The other is 
protocol. Generally, researchers are focus on one issue. 
In the next section, we mainly discuss optimal bidding 
strategy in different condition.  
 
3 STUDY OF OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY 
 
In this section, we consider a sale of two identical 
objects through second-price sealed-bid auctions. If a 
bidder wins an auction, she will leave the game. If she 
loses the first auction, she will bid in another auction 
with probability of 1.Each bidder intends to buy at most 
a single object i.e., the utility of a second object is 
assumed to be zero. In future work, we intend to relax 
this assumption. However, we conjecture that this will 
not qualitatively change the results obtained here as 
long as marginal utility is diminishing i.e. the utility 
gained from the second object is smaller than that from 
the first. In this paper, we define new bidders to be 
those that have not bid in any auctions selling the same 
item before. Seasoned bidders are those for whom the 
current auction is their second auction. It is easy to 
understand that a new bidder’s expected utility comes 
from both auctions. The first component of a bidder’s 
utility is the difference between her reservation value 
and price in the first auction; the second component is 
the corresponding difference in the second auction 
multiplied by the probability of losing in the first 
auction, because only if she loses in the first auction 
will she receive utility in the second auction. Since we 
use bidder’s expected payoff as her utility function, we 
are assuming risk-neutrality here. We assume that U1 is 
the utility from auction, r is reservation value,U2 is the 
utility from second auction and P is the probability of 
losing first auction, then, 
U1= | 0, if she loses; 
   | r, if she wins 
U2=|0, if she loses 
  |r, if she wins 
 
In the rest part of this paper, we will assume 
independent, private valuation, as in the private value 
model. We will also assume that within the same 
auction, there are two types of bidders –new bidders and 
seasoned bidders. We assume, mostly for ease of 
notation, that bidders of the same type adopt the same 
type of bidding function (strategy). From private-value 
model, we know that seasoned bidders would bid their 
reservation values. Hence, we take the following 
assumption: New bidders adopt the same type of 
bidding strategy b(v) , where v is a bidder’s reservation 
value. Bidders’ valuations are drawn independently 
from a distribution F(.). 
 
4 BIDDING STRATEGY UNDER CERTAINY 
 
We start by assuming that bidders know the number of 
new and seasoned bidders that will bid in each auction. 
As in all private value models, the bidder is assumed to 
know the distribution of reservation values of other 
bidders but the actual value is private information to 
each bidder. A seasoned bidder A will bid his 
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reservation value, since for him there are no future 
auctions. On the other hand, a new bidder, B has to 
consider how her first auction bid affects the likelihood 
of being able to participate in a second auction. Before 
formally deriving B’s optimal strategy, a simple 
example provides some intuition for B’s strategy. 
 
Example 1: B bids in two auctions. In either auction, B 
competes with another bidder whose bid is drawn from 
a uniform distribution U(0,6). B’s reservation value is 4. 
We consider the following alternatives: 
 
Alternative 1: B bids her reservation value in both 
auctions. Recall that since this is a second 




Alternative 2: B bids less than her reservation value in 
the first period and reservation value in the second 




The increments in her bid will increase her expected 
utility initially. Once it reaches 2.67, her expected utility 
begins to drop. Simple calculations show that the 
optimal bid for bidder B in the first period is 2.67. 
 
We define B’s expected utility if she bids x given her 








dΦ(x)                                (4-1) 
 
The first integral is the bidder’s expected payoff in her 
first auction, where Φ(z)=Pr(b(x(1)))<z&y(1)<z , and 
where b(x) is the other new bidders’ bidding strategy, 
and x(1) is the largest reservation value among new 
bidders (excluding bidder B) in auction 1.Hence the 
largest bid of new bidders is b(x(1)) . Similarly, y(1) 
denotes the largest reservation value, and hence, also the 
highest bid among seasoned bidders in auction 1. 
Similarly, we define x (1), y(1)  for the second auction as 
the highest bids among the new bidders and seasoned 
bidders (excluding B). 
ThereforeΦ(x)=Pr(b(x(1)))<x&&y(1)<x is the 
probability of B winning her first auction. The second 
term in equation (4-1) is B’s expected payoff in her 
second auction. 
 
Solving the first order condition for an interior optimum 
with respect to x, we have the following optimal first 
period bid x*: 
            x*(v)=v- ∫
v
0




Φ(z)dz is bidder B’s expected payoff if she 
bids in her second auction. 
 
From the above equation, we may derive the following 
properties of bidder B’s optimal strategy. 
 
Property 1:x * is B’s dominant strategy in the sense 
that it is independent of the strategies of other bidders in 
the first auction. 
 
Φ(x) includes all the information about the remaining 
bidders in the first auction. In B’s optimal strategy, 
there is noΦ(x), meaning that her first period bid is 
independent of the strategies of all other bidders. The 
conclusion may seem surprising but it is easy to 
understand. If we let v2 represent B’s expected payoff 
from period 2 auction, B’s “real” valuation of the first 
auction is v1-v2. Hence, according to the private-value 
model, B should bid her “real” valuation. 
 
Property 2: x *<v This property explains why some 
experienced bidders would like to bid less than their 
reservation values in the first auction. Simply put, the 
option of being able to bid in a second auction is 
valuable. The smaller the value of this option, the 
greater is the probability of winning in the first auction. 
Thus the first period bid must trade-off the payoff from 
the first auction against the option value. 
 
Property 3: * x increases when 2 N or 2 M increases. 
Here N2 and M2 denote the number of new bidders and 
seasoned bidders respectively. Intuitively, when the 
number of bidders increases, bidder B faces more 
competition in the second auction, which makes the 
second auction less valuable to her. Hence, B increases 




Online sequential auctions are different from 
non-Internet sequential auctions. In most theoretical 
models of sequential auctions, the number of auctions is 
fixed; bidders enter and leave the auctions at the same 
point (or winners leave and the rest remain). So, the kth 
auction of bidder A is also assumed to be the kth auction 
of bidder B. However, in online sequential auctions, no 
such symmetry can be assumed. Each bidder faces a 
continuous stream of auctions. Bidders enter those 
auctions at different times and may have participated in 
different number of auctions. Thus, the principal 
contribution of this paper is a model of online sequential 
auctions that captures important features of these 
auctions neglected in earlier models of sequential 
auctions. Next, we will mainly study on how uncertainty 
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